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The Aircraft Service Period Adjustment (ASPA) Program was designed to
determine the need to induct an aircraft into Standard Depot Level Maintenance
(SDLM) based on Period End Date (PED), material condition, flight time and
other factors in order to determine if the SDLM could be deferred for one year
before reinspection and/or induction. If the SDLM is deferred, the expenditure
of depot funds for an aircraft is deferred in the current year.
Initially, the program allowed for the extension and deferral of numerous
aircraft and did produce a one time saving. However, it has been observed that
deferring SDLM, results in the deterioration in aircraft material condition. More
over, ASPA brings significant uncertainty in depot parts support and SDLM
planning and scheduling. ASPA causes a redundancy of effort in duplicating the
aircraft inspections for ASPA and for induction into SDLM.
In this research we show that the termination of the ASPA Program will
significantly reduce the uncertainty and variability inherent in the Navy depot
induction process. With the variability reduced turnaround time, organizational
and depot workload, man hours expended and total costs will be improved.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A. BACKGROUND
The Aircraft Service Period Adjustment (ASPA) program is centered on an m-
depth inspection conducted by a depot level industrial P&E (Planner and Estimator)
team to assess the material condition of an aircraft to determine if a Standard Depot
Level Maintenance (SDLM) is warranted The purpose of this evaluation is to provide
a means of determining the need, based on material condition, flight time. Period End
Date (PED) and other factors, to induct an aircraft for depot level maintenance If the
material condition warrants, the aircraft would be extended for one year before
reinspection and/or induction This Navy unique program was instituted in 1982 to
provide a decision method whereby the induction of an airplane for depot maintenance
is based on material condition as well as its Operating Service Period (OSP) By
applying the ASPA process, depot induction deferrals have become a matter of
routine.
Over the twelve years since the commencement of ASPA, there has been
continuous budgetary pressure to defer depot inductions and the associated costs.
Budget planners often saw ASPA as a means of deferring Operations and
Maintenance, Navy (OM&N) costs in the current fiscal year Additionally, these
continued deferral decisions have not adequately addressed potential diseconomies
such as the change in squadron workload, the requirements of aging aircraft, and the
impact on aircraft material condition resulting from serial deferrals and the effect on
depot work content. Moreover, the effect of ASPA in depot back shop support,
inventory requirements and the increased production flow times has not been
considered.
Empirical evidence in the field of Logistics Engineering all support the theory
of a firm induction schedule as a means of assuring an efficient flow of aircraft to the
depot. This firm induction schedule reduces budgetary uncertainty, turnaround time,
uncertainty of parts support, and squadron workload. The process results in minimized
product variability, enhanced aircraft quality, and a reduced degradation of
components. The Navy is unique in that the Air Force and commercial airline
industry all employ a depot maintenance philosophy that adheres to inductions based
on firm operating periods.
Navy squadrons, airwings and maintenance officers are under enormous
pressure to avoid sending an aircraft to the depot for various reasons. Historically, the
Navy is slow in replacing those aircraft inducted to the depot When the aircraft is
replaced, the squadron is then left, initially, with an unfamiliar asset. The squadrons
often argue that the material condition of the aircraft dos not warrant sending it to the
depot The fleet considers the sailors' labor a free commodity and their efforts a small
trade-off versus for inducting the aircraft to the depot. As a result, depot deferrals
have become the rule rather than the exception. This practice has degraded aircraft
material condition and increased the workload content for both the squadron and the
depot As a result of ASPA, the "over and above"unanticipated requirements in labor
hours and materials SDLM work has increased, as well as SDLM turnaround times.
For those readers unfamiliar with Navy and Air Force maintenance, an
introduction and detailed description of the services maintenance policies can be found
in Appendix A.
Our study suggests that the Navy would be better served with a holistic
maintenance approach that features a total life cycle plan associated with each aircraft
bureau number. In this era of downsizing, the Navy needs to better manage the
reduced number of assets available and such an approach could help.
B. OBJECTIVE
The primary objective of this thesis is to determine the effects that ASPA has
had on Naval aircraft in three significant impact areas The first is the impact of
ASPA on depot rework material and labor costs and turnaround time. Secondly, the
effect ASPA has had on the material condition of the aircraft. Finally, the impact
ASPA has on the organizational level. Through our research, we will show that a firm
depot more efficient alternative to ASPA.
The Air Force and the commercial airline industry both employ a Planned
Depot Maintenance (PDM) concept to their respective depot maintenance philosophies.
This PDM program inducts aircraft for depot level rework based on a set time,
determined and adjusted based on empirical evidence and experience. Our research
compares the Navy unique ASPA program to the firm depot induction schedule used
by the Air Force and civilian airlines This comparison will show the contrast
between ASPA and PDM as well as document the significant impact ASPA has had
in Navy maintenance
The termination of the Navy's ASPA program could significantly improve
budget planning, reduce costs for depot level maintenance and eliminate an
uncompensated workload increase at the squadron level. By strictly adhering to
operating periods, the uncertainties and variabilities brought about by ASPA will be
eliminated.
C. SCOPE
This thesis is concentrated on the impact of firm induction schedules as
compared to depot induction deferrals. Specifically, the focus will be on material and
labor costs, schedule impact, material condition and parts support for Naval aircraft
under the Navy's ASPA program, with emphasis on the F-14 Tomcat and the Air
Forces' F- 1 5 PDM program
.
Through our research, we expect to determine that ASPA should be eliminated
and a firm induction schedule, like PDM, is the viable alternative This thesis will
assist in any future decision to evaluate ASPA as a depot maintenance philosophy
through the documentation of the consequences of the program on Navy depot and
organizational level maintenance.
D. PREVIEW
Chapter II will discuss the procedures for the ASPA and PDM programs.
Specifically, we will discuss depot maintenance induction procedures for the Navy's
F-14 Tomcat and the Air Force's F-15 Strike Eagle
Chapter III will compare the ASPA and PDM induction processes
Additionally, an explanation of the commercial airlines and the P-3 prototype program
will be provided.
Chapter IV will analyze the ASPA and PDM data for the F-14 and F-15 A
discussion of the trends in budget costs, depot completions and ASPA deferral rates
from fiscal years 1991 to 1994 will be provided.
Chapter V will be the summary, conclusions and recommendations
II. THE PDM AND ASPA PROGRAMS
A. DEFINING THE PDM PROGRAM
1. Introduction
The Air Force utilizes the Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) concept for
scheduling all aerospace vehicles and training equipment for depot maintenance The Air
Force Technical Order (TO) 00-25-4 outlines specific procedures and guidelines for the
induction of all Air Force regular and reserve aircraft
The maintenance engineering objective is to ensure the most timely and
economical means are utilized in order to achieve the most mission capable aircraft The
Air Force operational objective is to ensure that the depot pipeline of inductions does not
severely impact readiness for available aircraft. The criteria used for meeting this
objective includes a comparative analysis of costs and benefits to the Air Force Logistics
Command (AFLC).
The AFLC is responsible for the management of the Air Force's Depot
Maintenance program for all aerospace vehicles and training equipment The item
manager or Program Manager (PM) is responsible for the planning and scheduling of
depot maintenance for their respective programs
The Program Manager analyzes a variety of data sources as shown in Figure 1 to
determine the correct maintenance practices in support of his program His decisions are
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Requirements of Maintaining Command
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Figure 1 The AFLC as the Logistics Hub
These sources of maintenance data depicted in Figure 1 are evaluated to derive
the most optimal depot maintenance cycle. The TO states "except for unplanned
emergency requirements, depot maintenance will be based on a Maintenance Plan and
set intervals. This steady state scheduling of maintenance facilitates the programming
of depot dollars, material requirements, manpower requirements and facility
requirements." (AFTO. 1985)
Air Force field depot maintenance is only conducted if it justifies reducing the
aircraft's out of service time, or is severely hampering the units mission capability.
Only if field team maintenance can be advantageous to the government is it justified.
Otherwise, the field depot repair can be postponed and conducted on the next depot
maintenance interval.
2. The PDM Process
The PDM cycle is centered on the firm induction of aircraft based solely on
calendar time The cycle is firmly established on months of service and is measured
from the output date of the last PDM to the input date of the next PDM due. Figure 2
depicts the time line in which the PDM process works. A deviation of plus or minus
90 days is allowed from the actual PDM due date. Failure to specifically follow the
instructions outlined in the TO will result in the grounding of the aircraft, with the
exception of a one time flight to the depot
PPM due date
,
, I -180 days
interval of service /S J
B 1 @ 1 B
+90 days
_90 d
Figure 2. The PDM Cycle
The System Program Manager (SPM) in coordination with the organizational
controlling custodians, determine the depot maintenance requirements for each fiscal
year of service These maintenance plans include future and all planned maintenance
actions in the coming months/years.
These maintenance plans written by the SPM are extremely detailed and are
rigidly followed. These plans include:
1. Items of maintenance not associated with depot requirements but
need to be included in the specific guidelines. These include
such items as: economy of maintenance modifications, safety of
flight and negotiated maintenance/modifications.
2. Engine specific information to be used for planned
repair/replacement at the depot
3. All engine maintenance requirements to include the next due
major aircraft inspection tasks, and the correction of Safety of
Flight (SOF) defects. ( AFTO, 1985, pg. 13 CH 4)
The maintaining command can negotiate with the SPM for certain maintenance
to be accomplished concurrent with PDM to ease the burden on the organizational
level. Additionally, the Air Force does allow for incorporation of modifications and
inputs to be performed by field maintenance This is only done when modification
priorities and availability of kits or facilities are incompatible with PDM cycle.
The established intervals for depot maintenance have been ascertained through
experience and expertise in the maintenance arena The interval is derived by
allowing the material condition of the aircraft to pace the PDM cycle It can only be
adjusted by the (SPM) based on their technical expertise and authority The SPM, as
the maintenance engineering and logistics manager, is the only one qualified who can
determine a safe extension of the PDM cycle
The SPM, in coordination with the maintaining command develops input and
output schedules for PDM based on the needs of both the maintainer and operator
The user guarantees that sufficient aircraft are retained in order to accomplish their
mission, and the SPM ensures that all scheduled PDM aircraft are ultimately inducted.
Once the SPM has outlined the program, it is then forwarded for approval by
the AFLC When it is approved, copies of this plan are forwarded to the major
commands and user activities. This maintenance plan is a hard and fast plan that is
adhered to by all involved with that particular weapons system.
3. The Controlled Interval Extension ((IE) Program
The objective of the CIE program is to give the logistics manager in charge of
a weapons system, some latitude in changing the PDM intervals or work requirements.
The logistics manager has maintenance information on the aircraft from maintenance
data history , the requirements from the maintaining command and the needs of the
Air Force to adequately determine the proper interval for PDM.
The SPM is charged with scheduling Analytical Condition Inspections (ACI) on
representative sampling of his particular weapons system. The TO gives specific
guidance on sample sizes to be inspected as well as specific parameters for isolated
defects in 20% or more of the aircraft with a 90 percent confidence level ( AFTO,
1985, pg. 1-1, CH. 4)
Additionally, a periodic review and evaluation of the current PDM interval is
conducted on a regular basis to determine and reiterate the rational behind the length
of the set interval. The logistic tools for this evaluation are the ACI and the ASIP.
An ACI is an in-depth systematic disassembly and inspection of representative aircraft
to uncover hidden defects that are undetectable through normal inspection programs
The ASIP is a procedure applied to an aircraft system to enhance design,
diagnose potential or impending structural failure. These inspections include non-
destructive inspections (NDI). If the ACI and the ASIP data warrant that PDM
extensions are not feasible for this aircraft, the C1E progTam for that weapons system
will not be considered
When a weapons system PDM interval is evaluated and ultimately extended
under the CIE program, then upon its induction, it will be scrutinized to determine the
positive or negative effects of the extension. This analysis will then be used in
establishing future inspection requirements and PDM intervals.
4. The F- 15 PDM Program
The F-15 aircraft is a dual engine fighter aircraft utilized by the Air Force
primarily in an air superiority role, with secondary attack functions Manufactured by
McDonnell Douglas, the initial prototypes were flown in the early 1970's with the first
aircraft going to the Air Force in 1979. The last USAF F-15 A/B/C7D was delivered
in 1989 with the production resuming in 1991 for the Foreign Military Sales Program
(FMS).
The center for depot maintenance for the F-15 is Robins Air Force Base
located in Warner Robins, GA Robins AFB is Georgia's largest industrial complex,
covering more than 8,790 acres One of five Air Logistics Centers located throughout
the country, Robins provides cradle to grave logistics management support and depot
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Figure 3. F-15 Flow Diagram
The F-15 logistics managers have utilized planned depot maintenance intervals
throughout the entire life cycle of the aircraft. Figure 3 displays the flow days for a
complete PDM cycle. The Multi -Staged Improvement Program (MSIP) is an upgrade
for the aircraft that includes: improved central computer processing speed, multi-
purpose color display, internal countermeasures, and improved radar Total flow days
for a PDM only aircraft are 112 days, with MSIP improvements 174 days.
B. THE ASPA PROGRAM
1. Introduction
ASPA was instituted in 1982 by Naval Aviation Logistics Center
(NAVAVNLOGCEN). ASPA is an in-depth inspection conducted by a depot level
industrial P&E (Planner and Estimator) team to access the material condition of an
aircraft to determine if a SDLM is warranted. The purpose of this evaluation is to
provide a means of determining the need, based on material condition, flight time,
Period End Date (PED) and other factors, to induct an aircraft for depot level
maintenance. If the material condition warrants, the aircraft would be extended for
one year before reinspection and/or induction.
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The ASPA program recognizes that aircraft material conditions do not
deteriorate at the same rate. These degradations are functions of earner landings,
operating environments, catapult launches, operating cycles, and the quality of the
routine maintenance performed. All these factors are evaluated at the time of
inspection to determine whether SDLM for that particular bureau number can be safely
averted to the following year
The predecessor to the ASPA program called Aircraft Condition Evaluation
(ACE) was instituted by the Department of the Navy (DON) in the early 1970's.
Unfortunately, introduction of the ACE program significantly increased organizational
maintenance man-hours, and revealed less than optimal results; therefore, an
unacceptable number of fleet aircraft were in a non-flight status for extended periods
of time ( Borchers and Rowan, 1986)
Despite the failure of this initial program there still was a legitimate need from
an operational standpoint to keep aircraft not seriously degraded from the depot cycle.
It provided an orderly deferral of unwarranted SDLM's and also appeased the airwings
in keeping aircraft in service longer. The ASPA program is used on most Naval
aircraft today.
The ASPA program was designed to correct the mistakes of the ACE program
and alleviate the operational burden placed on the squadrons. The organizational
levels in the fleet are performing work that, due to levels of skill and expertise, should
be performed in the depots. This trend has grown as the ASPA progTam keeps aircraft
in the squadrons longer and places more of the maintenance workload on the backs of
the sailors. Many people incorrectly consider sailor labor free commodity, but it
actually costs the Navy significantly for their increased effort
This trend is a significant negative aspect of the ASPA program and is a
serious consideration that should be addressed in determining its future in Naval
maintenance
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2. ASPA Inspections and Inductions
All aircraft when placed into service in the fleet are assigned a Period End
Date This PED is a determination of the best interval of months for the aircraft to
remain in service before being inspected for consideration for a SDLM overhaul
Historically, the end of the Operating Service Period (OSP) was indicated by the PED.
The OSP for the F-14 is 56 months, however with ASPA, the OSP is actually seven
years before the aircraft is inducted into the depot The conclusion of the OSP prior
to ASPA signaled the need for SDLM rework to be performed ASPA changed this
perspective from an "on time" to an "on condition" method of depot maintenance.
Figure 4 depicts the time frame reference for the ASPA process. An aircraft's
material condition is evaluated normally six months prior and nc ater than three
months after the PED. The deferral if granted is for a maximum of twelve months.
Aircraft failing ASPA must be inducted no later than ninety calendar days following
PED. Those aircraft recommended for extensions of their PED's may have an
unlimited series of aircraft material condition evaluations and deferrals. ( Borchers
and Rowan, 1986)
interval of service
6 mo. 3 mo
Period end date exp.
Figure 4 The ASPA Induction Process
The Cognizant Field Activity (CFA) for each aircraft subject to the ASPA
program shall establish procedures and criteria to be used to certify ASPA evaluators.
The CFA maintains control and monitors the effectiveness of these evaluators to
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maintain a proficient, rapid and objective assessment of the general material condition
of aircraft candidates for rework ( OPNAVINST 4790. 2E, 1991)
The ASPA inspectors are specialists from the depot who are dispatched to
perform the inspection of the aircraft. Utilizing the Local Engineering Specification
(LES), a thorough examination of the aircraft's maintenance history is performed in
addition to the actual physical inspection. The inspector uses s grading system to
evaluate the aircraft Discrepancies are categorized as critical, major or minor and an
overall point total is assigned the aircraft Based on the total points accumulated, the
aircraft either passes or fails the inspection Visual Information Display
System/Maintenance Action Forms (VIDS/MAFS) are generated on the aircraft and
the organizational level or depot field teams performs the repair based on the seventy
of the discrepancy Should the aircraft fail, a one time flight to the depot is authorized
and the VIDS/MAFS accompany the aircraft to become part of the SDLM work
package
3. The F- 14 ASPA Program
The F-I4 aircraft is a supersonic twin engine, two seat, swing wing air
superiority fighter that was designed and produced by Grumman Aerospace
Corporation The F-14 Tomcat can handle numerous missions including air
superiority, Fleet Air Defense, and Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS)
reconnaissance The F-14A had been in the fleet for about eight years prior to ASPA
The F-14 ASPA procedure follows exactly the same procedure outlined above
The Period End Date for the F-14 is set at 56 months. This 56 months does not
equate to calendar time but rather 56 months of operating service The end of this
PED is the signal for the start of ASPA evaluations
13
C. PREVIEW
Chapter III compares the ASPA and PDM induction processes. Specifically,
we will discuss the consequences of ASPA on the material condition of Naval aircraft,
operational pace, and the organizational and depots levels maintenance efforts.
Additionally, we will explain the commercial airlines and the P-3 PDM prototype
program.
14
III. COMPARISON OF ASPA AND PDM PROCESSES
A. BACKGROUND
Before we can analyze and compare the two processes, we must first
understand the reasons why an aircraft is inducted into the depot They are inducted
for four reasons: The first reason is the engineering considerations to maintain the
fatigue life expenditure (FLE) to perform special structural inspections as set by Navy
engineers. The second reason is that the material condition of key elements in the
airframe degrade with extended use The engineering considerations are hard and fast
requirements for induction and never optional The third reason is for the engineers
and technicians at the depots to maintain the skills necessary to conduct in-service
engineering, promulgate grounding bulletins, design correction criteria, and certify
aircraft safe for flight after grounding. The final reason is that the depot possess the
technical expertise, tools and facilities to perform such extensive work
B. CONSEQUENCES OF ASPA
Recently, questions have arisen as to the original intent of ASPA, specifically,
the aircraft material condition has been outweighed by the increasing SDLM material
and labor costs. This is due to the deteriorating condition of the aircraft as they get
older. On average, an F-14 is in the fleet seven to eight years before it is finally
inducted into SDLM. Discussed further in chapter four, this equates to an aircraft
passing, on average, three ASPA's before it finally fails The longer an aircraft stays
in the fleet, the more it requires additional maintenance and parts "over and above"
the SDLM work package specification As the aircraft ages, more airframe
maintenance is required. As an example, the depots are experiencing an increase in
delaminations on F-14 control surfaces the longer the aircraft remains in the fleet.
This problem has deteriorated to the point affected parts must be remanufactured
during SDLM. This contributes to an increase in turnaround time (TAT) at the depot
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As shown in Figure 5, TAT in workdays has increased over the last three fiscal
years This "over and above" work during SDLM correlates to an increase in cost
resulting from more material required (new or remanufactured) due to greater wear or
because of overall degraded material condition and additional man-hours required to
complete the depot maintenance. Figure 5 shows a present average TAT of 267 days
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Figure 5. SDLM TAT in Work Days
In Figure 5, the data shows a very low R 2 value with the trendline having a
slight upward slope. Although there seems to be an increasing trend in TAT over
1990-1994 as shown in Figure 5, the regression line is not meaningful with an R 2
value of 0.1895. However, the minimum and maximum points run from 150 to 400
work days with a range of 250 days as examples of the extreme variability for an
aircraft to complete SDLM This variability in TAT would lead you to conclude that
the the depot will suffer from unanticipated parts demands with associated delays and
other factors such as unplanned back-shop requirements that could potentially delay
the completion of SDLM. Both graphs depict the uncertainty experienced by the
16
squadrons and airwings in receiving completed aircraft from the depot This
uncertainty explains the disincentives for the squadron and airwings to give up a
known asset
1. Defense Budget Climate
The current defense spending plays a critical role in the way the Navy
continues to conduct its maintenance programs because of the tension between budget
and maintenance requirements The President is seeking $250 7 billion in DoD budget
authority for fiscal year 1994 This is an $8 4 billion below the budget passed by
Congress for fiscal year 1993 This is a 8 5 percent decline adjusted for inflation
Figure 6 shows the Department of the Navy (DON) budgets fror 1985 to 1994
(Vanderwende. 1994) As the DON budget decreases, the costs of SDLM shows a
steady increase in pressure on that budget














Figure 6 DON Budget
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Figure 7 displays the depot rework budget from 1985 through 1994 We can















Figure 7. Depot Rework Budget
2. Cost Impact
By the year 2000, DoD will reduce the F-14 fleet to a core force of
approximately 251 aircraft. With a fewer number of assets in the aviation community
and an aging fleet of aircraft, the Navy needs to manage the existing aircraft with
more cost efficient maintenance schemes. DOD is no longer acquiring new F-14
aircraft For the remaining F-14 fleet, we need to reduce the variabilities in material
support, labor content, and budget manning. The focus should now be on putting the
SDLM process in control and not continuing to defer cost requirements into the future.
The Navy can no longer afford to keep doing business the way it is doing with the
ASPA program. In Chapter IV, we will show a projection analysis through the year
2000 on the cost of continuing the ASPA program. This projection demonstrates a
steady increase in the cost of ASPA through the year 2000.
18
The material cost of SDLM has increased from $300,000 in fiscal year 1990 to
approximately $600,000 in fiscal year 1994 This figure has almost doubled in four
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Figure 8. F-14 SDLM Material Costs
Figure 8 exhibits the SDLM material cost data on 39 bureau numbers which
completed SDLM from 1990-1994. The minimum and maximum points in Figure 8
run from $258,875 to $1,087,946 displaying the extreme variability in material costs
for aircraft completing SDLM. This variability is due to the "over and above"
material used by the depots, specifically, raw materials in the remanufacture of parts to
return the aircraft to proper material condition Although there seems to be an
increasing trend in material costs over 1991-1994 as shown in Figure 8
,
the regression
line is not meaningful with an R 2 value of 1 526.
Additionally, the SDLM budget is shrinking every year. This change in
material cost is a direct result of the deteriorating condition of the aircraft as a result
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of ASPA Inflation is also a small part of this cost increase For example, horizontal
stabilizers in 1991 cost approximately $150,000/ stabilizer and in 1994 cost $322,000.
the cost doubled in three years Additionally, in 1991 the Aviation Supply Office
(ASO) placed a 22 percent surcharge on its stock fund repairables. This coincides
with the decreasing DOD budget as previously discussed in the beginning of this
chapter The continuing budget cuts and down-sizing initiatives mandate positive
actions to reduce costs in the Navy.
This increase in the total SDLM cost is composed of, not only an increase in
materials, but an increase in the cost of labor required to perform the SDLM The



















Labor rates for 52 months from Apr. 1990 to Aug. 1994 FY9I-FY94
Figure 9. F-14 SDLM Labor Rates
Figure 9 shows an increase in the SDLM labor rate of $44.35 in fiscal year 1991 to
$53.83 in fiscal year 1994. These figures are in then-year dollars. This labor rate
increase contributes to the increase in the total cost of SDLM. Of the total labor and
material rate, a portion includes inflation. The other portion consists of the additional
raw materials required to remanufacture the parts as a result of the deteriorated
condition due to ASPA. The R 2 value of .78 shows a strong relationship that the labor
rate has been increasing each year. This increase in labor rate added to the increase in
man-hours are key factors in the increase cost of SDLM.
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The expended hours for SDLM has increased from fiscal year 199] to fiscal
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Figure 10. F-14 SDLM Expended Hours
Figure 10 shows the extreme variability in hours expended to complete SDLM
The time to complete an aircraft SDLM runs from a minimum of 18,546 man-hours
to a maximum of close to 40,000 man-hours. This variability in man-hours is
consistent with the TAT data in Figure 5.
{X) Impact on Organizational Level Maintenance
The impact that ASPA is having on organizational level maintenance is
significant. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Navy has changed the
procedures for depot level maintenance due to ASPA, but no changes were made at
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the organizational or intermediate levels. No significant change was ever made to the
SDLM specification or organizational level maintenance corrosion requirements to
compensate for the extended service periods We are tasking our sailors to perform
depot level maintenance by leaving the aircraft in the fleet longer For example as the
aircraft gets older and the material condition degrades, sailors have to perform more
preventive corrosion work Due to their lack of technical expertise, their treatments of
corrosion can actually further deteriorate the condition over time Now, the
organizational level maintenance technician has to perform more corrosion work than
his technical experience or skills allow. As the aircraft are continually spot painted by
the squadrons, the aircraft take on a "leopard" appearance, this sacrifices the corrosion
integrity of the aircraft. The end result is more work for the depv t This increase in
depot workload correlates to a longer turnaround time (TAT) for the aircraft as shown
in Figure 5. It takes approximately 100 organizational man-hours just to prepare an
aircraft for an ASPA inspection and 32 depot man-hours to actually inspect the
aircraft. Maintenance data does not reveal or code time expended by the squadron to
repair anticipated ASPA discrepancies which would be significant. If an aircraft fails
the ASPA inspection and has to be inducted into SDLM, these man-hours have been
useless Instead of sailors expending these man-hours reading the aircraft for
inspection, the organizational level maintenance technicians could be working on other
aircraft in preparation for the flight schedule
It is important to note that the ASPA process has made depot induction
subjective. Although it was not the original intentions of the ASPA program, it is a
"badge of honor" to a maintenance technician for the squadron to pass an ASPA
inspection. For the aircraft to fail the ASPA inspection, there is a sense of "failure"
felt by squadron maintenance personnel As a result of this thinking, the ASPA
program has made the SDLM process a subjective one and thus making the decision
to induct the aircraft more difficult.
The turnaround time for SDLM inductions at the depots are so excessive that
squadron replacements are slow. This leads to increases in the workload for the
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sailors in the squadron that squadrons are under tremendous pressure to avoid SDLM
inductions. They are now forced to perform depot level maintenance tasks with only
organizational level expertise As the ASPA deferrals increase, this creates an
additional SDLM workload increase and places a burden on the depot. The depot now
has to correct the work performed by organizational level technicians who do not
possess the depot skill or expertise to perform the work. The ASPA program, as a
whole, has had a significant impact on both the organizational and depot level
maintenance and materials and scheduling, TAT and parts support by increasing the
variability of the process
4. Planning and Scheduling
The ASPA program makes the planning and scheduling process extremely
difficult at both the depot and the organizational levels. There is a the high degree of
variability or uncertainty regarding the labor required, material required and the
number of aircraft inducted into SDLM each year With the ASPA program, there can
be no established schedule for inductions each year Therefore, no accurate planning
or forecasting can be made regarding the number of SDLM's the depot can expect
The Navy needs a method to track and maintain each aircraft it owns. There really is
no long range planning associated with each aircraft bureau number. Thisj)rocess,
currently, can only be conducted based on the aircraft's PED expiration for that fiscal
year. However, the ASPA program introduces a considerable amount of variability
into this process. One cannot predict which aircraft will pass ASPA until the P&E
evaluator inspects the aircraft This will continue to be a problem until there is some
firm induction period for the F- 14 or any other Navy aircraft. The firm induction
schedule, like the PDM process, will alleviate any planning or forecasting for the
squadrons and depots and eliminate variability from this process. Everyone in the
aircraft's chain of custody will be fully aware of which aircraft will be inducted and
when This schedule can be published for a multiple year period and facilitate long
range planning
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NADEP Norfolk, VA currently utilizes the NORMS system to determine
workload standards, material standards and planned turnaround times for aircraft and
engines under the SDLM program This system is a way to plan and estimate the
man-hours required, based on historical data, to perform an F-14 SDLM during a
given year In the next chapter, we will show that this current system has a extremely
high variability In our sample size of 39 bureau numbers, every completed SDLM
was underestimated in man-hours to complete the SDLM.
The depots hire their work force by the number of SDLM's they expect each
year. If they hire personnel for an upcoming SDLM and the aircraft is deferred, this
can be very costly to the depot. This uncertainty, created by ASPA, places a burden
on depot planning for manpower front loading for SDLM scheduling. The steady state
inductions that PDM provides will save money. The PDM process allows for less
variation in planning, workload and parts support which results in a cost savings.
Scheduling and planning is relatively easy with consistent, dependable time frames for
inducting all aircraft by bureau number.
5. Aircraft Material Condition
Aircraft material condition degrades as the number of ASPA deferrals increase
This degradation, over time, drives costs higher. It also creates an additional workload
above and beyond the standard requirements of SDLM. In the past, the depots would
complete F-14 SDLM's in 100 days. Now it takes, on average, over 267 days to
complete Chapter IV documents the material cost increases as the material condition
decreases. This is as a result of the aircraft aging as well as the deterioration of
58aircraft being deferred for SDLM due to the ASPA program For example, the F-14
flight controls, specifically auxiliary flaps and speed brakes, are being remanufactured
during the SDLM process. Because the SDLM is deferred, the aircraft's material
condition deteriorates the longer it is exposed to the aggressive environmental
conditions of carrier deployments and the rigors of fleet operation.
F-14 depot inductions show that the more ASPA deferrals the worse the condition.
Delamination problems on flight control surfaces add a total of 7000 hours to the
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SDLM process. This equates to a portion of the "over and above" cost, material and
turnaround time of SDLM. These structure problems combined with the increase in
turnaround time results in an increase in pipeline aircraft This makes planning and
scheduling difficult. Controlling the aircraft's material condition and thus controlling
planning for resource requirements must drive the SDLM process.
6. Subjectivity of ASPA Inspections
The ASPA inspection is conducted according to the F-14 Local Engineering
Specification (LES) The decision to induct an aircraft for SDLM is based on the
ASPA inspector's subjectivity and not actually based on flight hours or calendar time.
The LES provides a detailed comprehensive checklist of items and areas to be
inspected in determining whether the aircraft is inducted in to SDLM or deferred for a
year. The P&E team uses the LES during each ASPA inspection and records the
discrepancies Once complete, the P&E inspection team assigns the discrepancies a
defect code of major, minor or critical These defect codes are delineated in the LES
When the entire evaluation is completed, the P&E team totals the number of
graded discrepancies and subjectively determines the overall condition of the aircraft
There are some inherent problems associated with this inspector subjectivity. The
P&E evaluation has significant personal investment and all noted discrepancies are
judgemental The tendency is for the P&E evaluation to be more personality driven
than technical The P&E inspector, through technical knowledge and work
experience, determines the level of maintenance required to repair the noted
discrepancies. The levels of maintenance that are possible include the organizational
level and the depot. Based on this determination, the P&E inspector recommends the
aircraft remain in the fleet or induct the aircraft in to the depot for SDLM.
When an aircraft fails an ASPA inspection, the P&E inspector together with the
squadron and airwing, discuss the aircraft condition and determine the impacts of
inducting the aircraft in to SDLM The squadrons and airwings are under enormous
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pressure to avoid sending an aircraft to SDLM because the Navy has been historically
slow in replacing the aircraft It can take approximately six months to receive a
replacement aircraft and sometimes longer When the squadron finally receives an
aircraft, it is an unknown asset The fleet is under the misconception that a sailor's
labor is free and is a resource to avoid aircraft induction into the depot Moreover,
they retain a known asset With this pressure and influence, the P&E inspector can
defer a SDLM on a borderline aircraft. This subjectivity in inspections can cause
severe problems when a borderline aircraft is continually deferred. This inspection
subjectivity creates future impacts by passing problems to the squadron in the way of
increased workload, unskilled technicians repairing depot level discrepancies. They
also further impact the eventual depot induction by introducing uncertainty in
scheduling, parts support, increased TAT, and additional costs and material in the
SDLM process. This subjectivity in ASPA inspections creates problems in the short
and long runs As ASPA discrepancies promulgate from minor to major, the material
condition of the aircraft degrades to a point where it is no longer cost effective to
remain in the fleet. NADEP Norfolk, VA. recently had an aircraft pass ASPA
inspection number five! This aircraft had been in the fleet for almost ten years
without a SDLM.
C. CIVILIAN AIRLINE MAINTENANCE POLICIES
It is important to examine how the major civilian airlines schedule their major
aircraft inspections and maintenance in a cost critical environment For the purpose of
this discussion, the major airline contacted was Delta Airlines. The major airline
maintenance policies are governed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
under the Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) part 121. FAR requires a certificate
holder to establish and maintain a system that analyzes and surveys the performance of
its' maintenance and inspection programs on a continuous basis. The initial aircraft
maintenance requirements are determined by the aircraft manufacturer. Any changes
to these intervals are determined by the airline and require FAA approval. The
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airlines develop their own basic guidelines under the auspices of the FAR part 121
Their governing instruction for aircraft maintenance is called "Standard Practice". It is
a set of basic guidelines for aircraft maintenance policies and inspection intervals
approved by the FAA. It also establishes a time line for individual component
inspection intervals
Delta Airlines schedules their aircraft inspection intervals based on flying
hours This correlates to the concept of a firm induction schedule similar to PDM
The civilian airlines firm induction schedule for complete overhaul in continually
reviewed and analyzed for process modification This analysis and adjustment of the
interval is similar to the Air Force's Controlled Interval Extension Program In these
cases, the material condition and logistics data drive the maintenance interval, which is
a sound practice as these logistics factors are dynamic and ever changing
They conduct "progressive checks", or termed daily inspections by the Navy,
on the flight line over night Delta also performs "letter check" inspections, A,B,C
and E, similar to the phase maintenance inspections in the Navy. These "letter
checks" are completed in one week or less at the hubs in Dallas. TX., Tampa, FL. and
Los Angeles, CA. Delta's complete aircraft overhaul is conducted on a calendar
interval based on type/model aircraft. Atlanta, Georgia is the overhaul point for Delta
Airlines. This entire rework process takes a maximum of three to four weeks. (Bauer.
1994) For example, a Delta 727 aircraft is completed in less than 20 days using a 20
man crew, working three shifts, seven days a week. This compressed rework schedule
is to keep aircraft downtime at a minimum because of the loss in revenues when an
aircraft is out of service. All airlines must carefully scrutinize their overhauls during
the peak summer travel season in order to maximize aircraft availability.
D. WHY UTILIZE PDM?
Empirical evidence in the field of logistics engineering shows the theory of a
firm induction schedule as a means of assuring an efficient flow of aircraft to the
depot Both the Air Force and the commercial airline industry dictates the use of only
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the most cost efficient means of conducting an overhaul Both the Airlines and the
Air Force realize the importance of not deviating from a set induction schedule. The
positive effects of PDM is improved material condition, operational availability and
provide the best return on depot investment PDM minimizes uncertainties in
scheduling, planning, labor and material.
PDM has been designed as a cost effective, viable program to replace
SDLM/ASPA deficiencies by targeting material condition and corrosion areas that
have deteriorated from a continuous deferral of depot maintenance requirements. The
PDM process increases the frequency of corrosion treatment and prevention to
facilitate improved reliability in maintenance derived from the aging F-14 fleet.
E. THE OBJECTIVES OF PDM
The PDM concept is synonymous with steady state or firm depot induction
process The objective of PDM is to provide a firm depot induction schedule based on
aircraft airframe and component requirements. The depot induction schedule can be
determined through an reliability centered maintenance (RCM) analysis of the
individual components and the airframe As a result, the aircraft material condition
will be significantly improved PDM will enhance reliability in maintaining the
aircraft airframe and its components.
The escalating organizational level workload will be reduced with PDM.
Depot level maintenance will be returned to the depots. No longer will organizational
level technicians be burdened with the responsibility of performing maintenance
beyond their capability. The organizational level requirements must be changed to
facilitate PDM and effectively sustain aircraft material condition. Organizational level
maintenance workload continues to escalate. PDM gives the Navy a better return on
its' depot investment through a better depot product and an increase in the aircraft
service life. This is important in the era of down-sizing and reduced assets.
The PDM program will ease the forecasting in scheduling and planning at the
depots through a firm induction schedule. The squadrons and airwings will know,
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with relative ease, when an aircraft will be inducted, when a replacement can be
expected and plan accordingly PDM also provides for a cost savings through the
elimination of ASPA. The PDM program enables a reduction in the scope of SDLM
The redundant tasks are eliminated as well as certain organizational level tasks.
Additionally, PDM reduces concurrent component repair. PDM has shown that
component life cycles do not coincide with the current SDLM cycle The PDM
program is designed to reduce these negative trends in organizational level workload
increase, SDLM TAT, cost uncertainties in parts support and scheduling
F. THE P-3 PDM PROTOTYPES
The Navy P-3 program is currently conducting a prototype program on four
P-3 aircraft. The initial analysis began in 1989 for the PDM program on the P-3
aircraft. The reasons for this change in depot maintenance philosophy, as a result of
ASPA, is deteriorating material condition, rapidly escalating number of field teams in
service repairs (ISR), deteriorating ASPA results, and rapidly escalating organizational
level man-hours. The service life of the P-3 has been extended from 30 years to 50
years with the cancellation of the P-7/P-3H. No replacement aircraft is currently
planned for the P-3
RCM and age exploration analysis of historical data determined the depot
requirements under PDM The P-3 PDM interval was set at four years. After four
years, maintenance man-hours/per flight hour began to increase Additionally, under
ASPA the original paint protection had eroded and was a significant factor in the
further deterioration in the material condition of the aircraft. The PDM interval of
four years will ensure that proper paint protection is applied with consistency
The PDM cycle for the P-3 aircraft consists of three phases at four year
interval for each phase. Figure 1 1 displays the three phases of the PDM cycle and
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Figure 1 1 The P-3 PDM Cycle
The P-3 will be inducted into depot three times in 12 years rather than one
time in ten years. To obtain a valid sampling, the Navy used sample prototypes
comprised of aircraft in both good and poor material condition. Based on the P-3
data, we feel the Navy should consider a PDM prototype program on the F-14.
Additionally, F-14 historical data and other information will need to be collected




Chapter IV will compare the ASPA and PDM sample data for the F-14 and F-
15. We will discuss trends in budget costs, depot completions and ASPA deferral
rates from fiscal years 1991 to 1994 An explanation of the Logistic Support Analysis
to determine the future consequences of the ASPA process
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IV. ANALYSIS OF ASPA AND PDM DATA
A. INTRODLCTION
This chapter will attempt to compare the ASPA and PDM sample data for both
aircraft A projection analysis on how these respective depot maintenance philosophies
impact their respective service, specifically in the areas of cost and aircraft maintenance
intervals.
B. INDUCTION DEFERRAL RATES
This section analyzes the F-14 ASPA deferral rates from fiscal years 1991 to 1994
to detect patterns in post ASPA inspection induction deferral over this period PED
extensions of up to one year can be given for those aircraft that successfully pass an
ASPA inspection. Under ASPA, aircraft may receive numerous deferrals, as a result,
aircraft tour lengths would increase significantly An example of these deferrals can be
seen in the last four columns of Table 4 which provides for 39 F-14 bureau numbers the
actual number of deferrals on each aircraft
The ASPA inspection data provides the results of 665 inspections conducted by
depot personnel at organizational and airwing sites during the four year period from
1991 to 1994. Figure 12 represents F-14 deferral rates by tour. These deferral rates were
collected on aircraft from both east and west coast Naval aircraft.



















Figure 12. ASPA Deferral Rates by Tour
These inspections over extended periods account for increased costs and hours at
the organizational and depot levels For example, these 665 inspections over four years
cost an estimated SI .7 million This amount does not account for squadron time
expended for pre and post ASPA corrections which are likely to be significant. These
man-hours and dollars could be utilized more effectively, if the ASPA inspection was
eliminated and a firm induction process is implemented
Table 1 shows the deferral rate is highest for First tour aircraft These first tour
aircraft have a deferral rate of 93.26 percent The deferral rate steadily declines as the
aircraft ages and the number of tours increase from one to four This is graphically
displayed in Figure 12
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Table 1 ASPA I Deferral by Tour
The data from Table 1 indicates that the average number of F-14 ASPAs per tour
is two to three. This means that the aircraft has served it's 56 month service period plus
two or three 12 month extensions. This equates to an aircraft remaining in the fleet
greater than seven years before it is inducted for a SDLM These deferral rates are
accepted practice for Navy aircraft
As the deferral rates increase, meaning the aircraft is in service longer, the
material condition of the aircraft degrades. These deferral rates are directly related to the
amount of time that aircraft remain without depot service and are contributing to the poor
material condition of the aircraft as they enter the depot.
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C. SDLM COSTS
Chapter ill discussed m detail the problems being experienced by Navy
maintenance personnel to keep the aging tleet of F-I4s in service These problems are
specifically more hours of preventive and corrective corrosion work performed as part of
their routine phase inspections The deferral of depot maintenance as standard practice
has exacerbated many of these problems The costs of deferring depot inductions is
particularly evident when one traces the rising costs of SDLMs from fiscal year 1991 to
1994 and displays in monetary terms and increased man-hours the impact of continuous
ASPA deferrals Additionally, no time value of money was added to the comparison, all
dollars are displayed in 1993 values.
Figure 13 shows graphically the total SDLM cost of 39 F- 14s that were inducted
to NADEP Norfolk from 1991 to 1994. The 39 points were plotted in sequence from
1991 through 1994 and a linear regression line was fit through the points to display trends
in the data series. The R squared value shows some relationship between the trendline
and the data points. The trendline has a positive slope that implies an increase in cost
from 1991 to 1994. The variability in the data points is obvious as the low and high
points range from $1.127904 to $2,71 1.617 This variability of costs to get an aircraft
back to the proper material condition once inducted displays the degraded and mixed
condition of the F- 14 fleet and a depot induction process that is not in control.
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39 Bureau number SDLM costs from 1991 to 1994 with extended trendline
Figure 13 F-14 SDLM Costs With Extended Trendline
Figure 13 extends this trendline to display the impact of increased costs into the
future. This direction if not reversed would put the cost of an aircraft to go through
SDLM in excess of 3 million dollars by the year 2000 using 1993 dollars
While all rework facilities nationwide both commercial and military are
experiencing increased costs due to countless variables inherent to this type of work. This
F-14 increase in costs represents too severe a growth trend to attribute totally to outside
uncontrolled factors such as labor rate increases, contract changes, and inflation plaguing
all similar maintenance efforts The commercial airline maintenance industry survives
on their aggressive maintenance programs and continual efforts to control costs The
airline industry adheres to firm inductions for maintenance because it provides the best
















Table 2. F-14 and F-15 Expended SDLM Man-hours
Table 2 shows both the F-14 aircraft in terms of expended man-hours to complete
depot rework for an F-14 and F-15 aircraft The hours to complete an F-14 are almost
three times as great as an F-15 in 1991 While the F-15 experienced increased man-hours
in 1993, the hours to complete an F-14 are more than double that of the F-15. One factor
for this increased workload requirement on the F-14 is the inferior material condition
upon induction when depot maintenance is finally conducted
D. ANALYSIS OF THE F-14 AND F-15 DATA
1. Qualifying the Data
We visited Robins AFB in Warner Robins, GA to review and analyze the Air
Force's F-15 program This aircraft was selected since it is comparable to the Navy's F-
14 in many ways. Both aircraft are similar in age, the F-14 began service in 1972 and the
F-15 in 1976. The two aircraft are fighters, both have similar missions and like designs,
and both are dual engine aircraft. It is true that the operating environments of the two
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services are very different in that the rigors of carrier flight operations is more damaging
to the aircraft The data received encompasses all the aspects of depot maintenance to
include man-hours expended, material costs to repair, and detailed summations of the
estimates for each of these categories.
Table 3 depicts the data collected on the F-15 during this visit It shows the
number of aircraft inducted for 1991 and 1993 as well as the actual average hours to
complete those aircraft.
The data contained in Table 4 was received in June of 1994 from NADEP
Norfolk The data received encompasses all the aspects of depot maintenance to include
man-hours expended, material costs to repair, and detailed summation of the estimates
for each of these categories. Table 4 represents a collection of maintenance data on
actual Navy F-14 bureau numbers that underwent depot level maintenance between
October 1991 to December 1994 The sampling consists of 39 F-14 aircraft and is
comprised of both the F-14A,B models presently in the fleet. This sample size represents










NBR inducted avq actual hrs Labor rate
34 8 212 00 $ 71 62 $
F-15 1993 44 12,355 00 $ 71 62 $
Table 3 F-15 PDM Data for Bureau Numbers in 1991 and 1993
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Table 4 F-14 ASPA Analysis Spreadsheet
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2. The F-l 4 Average Fleet Aircraft
The data from Table 5 shows the average F-l 4 data profile of 39 aircraft Most
notable is the F-l 4 hours of 28.144 per SDLM and the cost of 1.866.594.08 dollars
These figures represent a significant expenditure in manpower and dollars for the Navy
to get an aircraft through the depot process Additionally, the number of deferrals
discussed in Section A of this chapter reaffirm that the average fleet aircraft experiences
two to three deferrals before induction From interviews of inspectors at NADEP
Alameda (P-3) and NADEP Norfolk, revealed that in their experience that the usual
number of ASPAs done on an aircraft was three bv the time it was inducted
f-14 A\KAGE AlECEAfT 1 UTILE
AVERAGE OF 39 AC
AVG TOUR# 1675
AVG AGE IN MONTHS 93 8
AVG #OF SDLMS 2
AVG # OFMO TO INDUCT 23
AVG HOURS PER SDLM 28,144
AVG MATERIAL COST $ 527.588.33
AVG TOTAL SDLM COST $ 1 .866 594 08
Table 5 The F-14 Average Aircraft Profile
E. PROJECTION ANALYSIS OF THE F-15 AND F-14 MAINTENANCE
CYCLES
1. Comparisons
The following section is a comparison of a typical Air Force F-15 and a Navy
F-14 under the PDM and ASPA Programs, respectively. This analysis is performed to
clearly display the impact that depot induction procedures can have on the frequency of
maintenance performed and ultimately the material condition of the aircraft
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2. F- 14 and F-15 1993 Data
The following data for Table 6 is taken from Tables 3 and 4 and represents 1993
data for both the F-14 and the F-15 aircraft The key figures for each aircraft are the
average hours per SDLM. as well as the cost. For comparison the labor rate from
Norfolk of S71 .62 was used for both aircraft This data will be used to make
comparisons for 1993 and provide insights into future vear trends.
r-i4 average fy 1993 motile
AVERAGE OF 15 AC
AVG # OF ASPA DEFERRALS 23
AVG # OFMO TO INDUCT 28
AVG LBR RATE(NORFOLK) $ 71 62
AVG HOURS PER SDLM








f-1^> AVELAI3E LT 1993 EM
AVERAGE OF44 AC
PDM CYCLE (mo)
AVG LBR RATE(NORFOLK) $
AVG HOURS PER SDLM
AVG TOTAL SDLM COST $
Table 6. Aircraft 1993 Profile of F-14 and F-15
3. Comparative Assumptions
For consistency, the average depot rate of 1993 ($71 .26) for NADEP Norfolk was
used for both depots due to the fluctuations in geographic region, inflation, and contract
changes. No attempts were made to factor out the age of the aircraft in any of our
calculations, as an in-depth cost analysis involving age factors is beyond the time
constraints of this project.
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4. The F-l 4 Cycle
Figure 14 displays a time line of an F-14 aircraft and the maintenance actions that
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Figure 14. The F-14 ASPA Cycle
During this timeframe both aircraft entered service in 1993 directly from each of
the respective depots The F-14 goes through the typical PED of 56 months and in 1998
the PED expires making it a candidate for ASPA 1 This F-14 goes through two
extensions, and is a candidate for depot rework in the year 2000 It enters SDLM in the
year 2000 and experiences close to a year (300 days average) turnaround time, as
referenced in Chapter III The aircraft returns to the fleet in the year 2001 and remains in
service until the expiration of its PED in the year 2006 at which time the ASPA
inspection process begins again The average F-14 remains in the fleet another two to
three vears before it is ultimatelv inducted again
Table 7 displays the costs in terms of dollars spent and man-hours for the one F-
14 SDLM performed during the analysis time period
F-14 ASPA CYCLE SUMMATION
induction/vr cost hours
2000 $ 2 088 691 87
total • $ 2,088 691 87
29 170
29,170
Table 7 F-14 ASPA Cycle Cost Summation for One SDLM
5. The F- 15 Cycle
Figure 1 5 displays the typical, F-l 5 aircraft under the PDM Program from the year
1993 to 2006
F-l 5 PDM CYCLE
in service in service





Figure 15 F-l 5 PDM Cycle
The F-l 5 has an operating service period of six years and is inducted in the year
1999 for rework Following the average turnaround time of around 100 to 120 days, the
aircraft returns to service for another six years where it is ultimately inducted between
the year 2005 to 2006
The TAT for the F-l 5 is significantly lower than the F-14 since its induction to
the depot is on a Firm basis and not subject to deferrals. This is inherent in firm
induction programs as the maintenance teams do not have to perform all aspects of depot
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maintenance in one cycle. Rather there can be a better scheduling of all the particular
aspects of maintenance, as the aircraft will be returning to the depot on a regular interval
F-15 PDM CYCLE SUMMATION
induction vr cost hours
1999 $ 884 865 10
2005+ $ 88486510




Table 8. F-15 PDM Cycle Cost Summation for Two PDMs
Table 8 displays the comparable costs for the F-15 aircraft in terms of man-hours
and depot dollars for the 2 SDLMs performed
6. Projection Analysis Realization
The results of this projection are that the F-15 is inducted for two PDMs to every
one SDLM induction for the F-14 The F-15 aircraft is not only seen in this comparison
one more time by their respective depot but actually costs S3 1 8,96 1 60 less to perform
The inherent problems associated with the absence of a firm depot induction policy
caused by the ASPA Program would all be addressed by removing the variability of the
present depot induction philosophy on the F-14 aircraft Referenced in Chapter 111. the
increased depot TAT, scheduling variability, and organizational workload increase could
all be significantly reduced with the PDM Program or any program that incorporates
some firm set induction period.
The message in this comparison is clear, a firm induction process for depot
maintenance increases the quality in material condition due to more frequent attention
given to that particular aircraft Additionally, these more frequent intervals cost less to
perform as the total cost of maintaining these aircraft are amortized over more frequent
inspections/inductions rather than one significant costly maintenance effort. The Logistic
Support Analysis (LSA) concept confirms the theory that firm induction period will
always outperform a system that possesses increased variability in their process
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The LSA concept is an invaluable tool that involves a continuous ongoing effort
to analyze all aspects of a weapons system to arnve at cost effective methods for areas
such as the correct blend of preventive and corrective maintenance actions and initial
supportability requirements to name a few Further explanation of how LSA concept is
tied to the Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILS) can be found in Appendix B.
The Navy needs a comprehensive plan to get their aircraft on a firm induction
schedule. This LSA concept prov ides the framework in which to establish this
comprehensive plan of set depot inductions. The logisticians should analyze the
maintenance data to validate the correct OSP period for the aging F-14 and establish a
firm induction process based solely on the OSP.
F. PREVIEW
The concluding chapter includes the Summary, Recommendations, and
Conclusions.
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis has focused on the impact the ASPA program has had on the
organizational and depot levels of maintenance using the F-14 aircraft as an example
The analysis has centered on material and labor costs, schedule and planning impact,
material condition, parts support, organizational and depot workload and turnaround
time under the ASPA program
We have found that terminating the ASPA program will significantly reduce
the major cost drivers attributable to its variabilities and uncertainties in TAT, work
schedule and manpower planning Additionally, the potential to retard material
condition degradation due to administratively extended Operating Service Periods and
reduce the workload at the squadrons and the "over and above" workload at the depots
will be significant
It is clear that adopting a firm induction schedule solely based on strict
adherence to a specified operating service period such as the Air Force's PDM
program will achieve the desired results. The notion of a firm induction schedule as a
means of achieving tighter control of the depot process variables is supported by
MILSTD 1388, the Logistics Support Analysis.
In order to establish the framework for analyzing the F-14 and the F-15
aircraft, we presented the background and general overview of the ASPA and PDM
programs. We analyzed data from fiscal years 1991 to 1994 and developed a
projection analysis model to determine the frequency of depot maintenance performed
on the aircraft, labor hours required to complete a SDLM and the total SDLM cost
Our analysis has shown that increasing the frequency of depot inductions based on a
firm schedule will decrease the variables, cut duplicate inspection efforts, improve the
average condition of airplanes at induction and cut costs Moreover, as in the P-3
PDM example, the environmental protection system (paint, primers, coatings etc ) will
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be renewed more frequently, decreasing the squadron workload, reducinj
and eliminating the "calico" appearance of tactical Navy airplanes.
B. CONCLUSIONS
From our analysis, we conclude the following:
1. The average workload per F-14 aircraft increased by 9,712 from 24,041
hours in 1991 to 33,753 hours in 1994.
2. The ASPA program introduces uncertainty in parts support, material
condition, labor content, flow time and scheduling during the SDLM process.
3. In addition to the above, there are associated rising costs for SDLM's.
4. Eliminating ASPA will promote accuracy, streamlining and process control
of depot and modification induction planning, budget planning, scheduling and
resource analysis for Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (ACNO) for Air
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Our study did not examine such factors as the impact of ASPA on operational
readiness The authors recognize that there are also many areas of depot maintenance





A. NAVAL AVIATION MAINTENANCE STRUCTURES
Ail Naval Aviation Maintenance is broken down into three levels organizational,
intermediate, and the depot levels This three tier maintenance concept allows for an
extensive intermediate component repair concept to accompany the Naval Air Wings
while deployed aboard a carrier The depot level is heavy equipment oriented and has the
specialized talents and equipment to allow for a complete overhaul of fleet aircraft but
still maintain control and expertise organic to the Navy (DON, July 1991
)
1. The Organizational Level
Organizational level maintenance is normally performed by an operating unit on a
day to day basis in support of its own operation The goal of all organizational level
maintenance is to maintain the aircraft in a full mission capable status while continually
improving the local maintenance process










2. The Intermediate Level
The intermediate level of maintenance is performed by designated maintenance
activities in direct support of the organizational levels The mission of the Intermediate
level is to enhance and sustain the combat readiness and mission capability of the
organizational level by providing quality and timely material support and component
repair The total maintenance sphere of the intermediate level consists of on and off
equipment material support to include
1 Component repair
2 Manufacture of selected components
3 Perform aircraft maintenance when required
4 Age exploration under RCM
5. Incorporation of TD's
6 Component processing
7 Calibration for O & i-levels
8 Technical assist to O-levels
3. The Depot Level
The depot level maintenance is performed at Naval Aviation industrial
establishments to assure the continual flying integrity of airframes and flight systems.
Depot level maintenance is an extensive level of maintenance usually involving major
overhaul or rebuilding of parts or components The capabilities of depot level include
the manufacture, modification, testing, inspecting, sampling and reclamation of aircraft
parts.
The purpose of depot level is to support the lower levels of maintenance by
providing engineering assistance and performing maintenance that is beyond the
capabilities of organizational or intermediate levels.
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The functions of depot level maintenance may be defined as
1 Complete overhaul of aircraft
2. Manufacture or modification of engines, aircraft, and support equipment
3 Technical and engineering assist
4. Age exploration under RCM
5 Incorporate TD's
6 Manufacture or modify parts kits
7. Repair and rework components and support equipment
8 Repair and rework engines
9. Calibration
B. AIR FORCE STRUCTURE
In more recent years, the Air Force has evolved into a truly two tier maintenance
system That is. they have the significant portion of component repair done at specialized
organizational levels and if needed they are assisted by specialists at the depots
In order to meet the specific maintenance requirements of major weapons systems,
the Navy and Air Force have each adopted their own unique Maintenance Programs
Realizing the different and distinctive missions these services are required to perform,
both interestingly enough have similar maintenance structures set up to deal with their
respective missions
The two services operate in completely opposite environments To a degree some
of the maintenance philosophies and practices have been shaped by the environments in
which they function. Obviously, the Navy had to adopt maintenance procedures that
would deal with their extremely corrosive environment at sea. Meanwhile, the Air Force
operates in many cases with a much more stable dry environment These factors and
many more have shaped the respective maintenance concepts of the services.
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Both services have a talented infrastructure and most of the resident specialization for
this is housed at their respective depot maintenance facilities
Both services are being forced to continue flying aircraft that were never intended
for such extended years of service Because of this there is a great need for an extremely
efficient maintenance infrastructure that can essentially rejuvenate and extend the service
life of specific major platforms
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APPENDIX B.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MAINTENANCE PLAN
This thesis deals specifically with Naval and Air Force maintenance philosophies
and practices tor the depot level rework of their Aviation branches To truly understand
how a changing of a procedure in any level of maintenance will affect the total logistics
plan, one must first understand how the services derive the total Integrated Logistics
Support Plan (ILS) for the aircraft. The Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) Concept is a
tool that utilizes all the aspects of the data analysis to better derive procedures and plans
of support With this better understanding of the ILS Plan and how it is derived using the
tools of LSA, a more efficient evaluation of any change in maintenance procedures will
impact the total effectiveness of that services maintenance efforts
The maintenance concept of a weapons system is developed from operational and
planning considerations early in the design phase of a system. As the system progresses
through the early phases of development, these inherent restraints and limitations in the
design have a direct effect on the reliability and maintainability From the initial design
requirements, the designer and manufacturer realize the positive aspects of the weapons
svstem's performance along with its limitations Within these limitations and design
environment the maintenance program is established Therefore, they pattern the
maintenance concept of a weapons system with the following considerations:
1 Operational and maintenance environment in which it will operate
2 The required availability rate
3. The planned utilization rate
4. The frequency of maintenance (scheduled and unscheduled)
5 The quality assurance philosophy needed to provide adequate support
6 The availability of personnel and skills
7. The previous experience with similar systems and equipment.
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8. The design and maintainability goals of the user
9 Always the cost and time limitations
Three critical areas of the maintenance program are reliability, maintainability, and
the maintenance requirements I hey must be developed concurrently to predict and
produce a realistic and manageable maintenance program. Reliability is a design
characteristic based on failures per unit of time Maintainability is also a design
characteristic that relates to the degTee of ease or the degree of difficulty in performing
maintenance on the system
The maintenance requirements are a direct result of reliability and maintainability
achieved in the design phase These maintenance requirements will dictate to a great
extent the maintainability goals of the user organization.
Once these reliability and maintainability goals have been established and met to the
satisfaction of all involved, they will dictate the maintenance requirements through a
systems life cycle
The summation of factors considered in the evolution of a maintenance philosophy
includes:
I Planned maintenance levels needed
2. Common or peculiar support equipment
3. Maintenance task aids
4 Special skills











1 J Manpower factors
I his Maintenance Plan is an integral part ot the overall Integrated Logistics Support
( ILS) Plan 1 his ILS plan is an orderly procedure to be followed during the programmed
lite cycle ot the airframe, from the initial requirements generation through the actual
production
I herefore, each phase of the life cycle and therefore each phase of the ILS Plan
must consider all the elements of support, including maintenance
I he interdependence of the Operational Concept. Maintenance Concept, and the ILS
Plan can not be overemphasized It should be obvious that a change in any one of these
will ultimately impact the factors involved in the other three
Once the maintenance concept has been established for all levels of maintenance it
is essential that a change in any factor be considered only in terms of the total integrated
system support.
Any change in the maintenance concept for organizational, intermediate or depot
level must be considered in the total sphere of integrated system support It is a
reasonable conclusion that a change in one factor will have some impact on some other
area of the operational or maintenance support plan
1 hat is one of the theories of this thesis 1 here was a very definite departure in the
maintenance practice by deferring depot inductions This departure in and of itself is not
to be considered a negative undertaking However, to make this change without
considering how this change effected the total Logistics plan is not in the best interest of
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